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SCHAD . BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM: A
PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The zoning power1 and the first amendment right of free expres-
sion,2 collided at the Supreme Court level for only the second time in
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.' As in the initial confrontation,4
the Court was faced with the difficult question of how the right of free
expression limits a municipality's exercise of the zoning power. In
I. The Supreme Court recognized zoning as a legitimate aspect of the police power in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The police power is the
broad legislative power vested in the states which enables them to address problems or needs
of local public interest. The police power, when exercised for zoning purposes, has been
referred to as the "zoning power." D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 3 (1970).. In
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954), the Court described the scope of the zoning
power.
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are
some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police
power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and
do not delimit it.... .It is within the power of the legislature to determine that a
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Zoning was introduced in the United States as a reform of the nuisance law that had
been made necessary by the rapidly increasing complexity of modem urban life. R. NEL-
SON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (1977). It is generally accepted that zoning began in
1916 with the New York City zoning ordinance. Id at 8. The New York City ordinance
divided the city into residential, commercial, and unrestricted-use districts. Id at 9. Build-
ing height was also regulated. Id Ordinances based on the New York model were rapidly
introduced so that by 1926, the year Euclid was decided, 425 municipalities representing
more than half the urban population of the country had enacted zoning ordinances. Id
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech . . . ." The first amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). The
first amendment embraces many forms of communicative expression as speech. See, e.g.,
Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (films, books, and other forms of
speech are protected by the first amendment).
3. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
4. The initial confrontation between free expression and the zoning power at the
Supreme Court level occurred in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of Young see infra notes 36-67 and accom-
panying text. See also, Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1196 (1976);
Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: 4 Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12
NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 391,416-18 (1976); Note, Young v. 4merican Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating
Levels of Protected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 321, 357-59 (1977); Note, Zoning,
Adult Movie Theatres, and the First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L. Rlv. 379, 410-11 (1977).
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Schad, the question was complicated by the fact that the challenged
zoning ordinance had been used to prohibit a controversial form of
expression: adult entertainment.' The municipality contended, and the
state courts agreed, that the imposition of criminal penalties for the
exhibition of live nude dancing within a commercial zone was a legiti-
mate exercise of the zoning power.'
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention in Schad
Relying on the first amendment overbreadth doctrine, 7 a majority of
the Court held that the zoning ordinance, as construed by the state
courts, imposed an overbroad prohibition on protected forms of expres-
sion.' The decision therefore assumes special significance as the first
instance where a majority of the Court has sustained a first amendment
challenge to the zoning power.9
The triumph of the right of free expression, however, was less than
complete. The overbreadth analysis employed by the majority neces-
sarily framed the issue in general terms; the majority focused on the
right to view and exhibit "all live entertainment."' 0 The facts of Schad
arguably presented an opportunity to resolve the lingering question of
whether adult entertainment enjoys the same degree of protection af-
5. It is important. . . to keep in mind the distinction between, on the one hand,
"adult" books and movies and on the other hand, "obscene" books and movies.
Although the public mind may tend to equate the two, the law allows no such
equation. Numerous judicial pronouncements recognize that "sex and obscenity
are not synonymous." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Obscenity,
in the legal sense requires the tri-partite test enunciated in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973). . . .Thus, as a matter of legal terminology, the terms "adult" and
"sexually-oriented" contain an implicit presumption that the materials referred to
are legal and nonobscene, or at least that they are protected until there has been a
judicial determination of their obscenity.
F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESsEs 3 n.l 1 (1977). This note uses the term
"adult entertainment" to refer to commercial, .nonobscene forms of entertainment that are
sexually oriented. This includes sexually oriented books, magazines, films, and live
performances.
6. 452 U.S. at 64.
7. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine protects first amendment rights from laws
that "are so broadly drafted that the range of possible applications violating the first amend-
ment is substantial." In an overbreadth analysis, the law in question is scrutinized on its
face "without regard to the particular complainant's conduct. Rather than excise particular
invalid applications one by one as they arise, the Court has employed the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine to short circuit the process by invalidating the statute and putting it up
to the legislature for redrafting." Note, The First Amendment Overbreadh Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REV. 844, 844-45 (1970) (footnote omitted).
8. 452 U.S. at 66, 76-77.
9. For a discussion of prior unsuccessful first amendment challenges to the zoning
power, see infra notes 22-67 and accompanying text.
10. 452 U.S. at 65-66.
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forded other forms of expression." The majority's analysis avoided this
question, leaving local zoning authorities without clear guidance in
their efforts to regulate adult entertainment.
Moreover, due to the manner in which the majority posed the issue
in Schad, the scope of the holding is susceptible of dramatically con-
flicting interpretations. Intrepreted broadly, the opinion implies that a
political subdivision cannot completely exclude or ban nonobscene
adult entertainment from its jurisdiction. Interpreted narrowly, how-
ever, the opinion may imply the contrary conclusion that the zoning
power, under certain circumstances, may properly be used to ban adult
entertainment within the boundaries of a zoning entity. This ambiguity
inspired several of the Justices to address the unanswered questions in
separate opinions. Consequently, the decision, which purports to re-
solve the difficult constitutional issue on settled first amendment princi-
ples, contains within it the seeds of further complications of this "still
emerging area of the law."' 2
This note will analyze the Schad decision and highlight the histori-
cal relationship between the zoning power and the first amendment. It
will assay the scope of the holding and its possible impact upon future
conflicts between free expression and the zoning power. In addition,
this note will scrutinize suggestions by certain members of the Schad
Court that, under special circumstances, heretofore protected forms of
expression may properly be banned from a community through the use
of the zoning power. The rationale and precedent supporting and un-
dercutting this assertion will be analyzed in light of its potential for
future application.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Zoning Power: The Presumption of Validity
The Supreme Court first recognized the zoning power in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'3 In Euclid, a property owner challenged a
local zoning ordinance that restricted certain zones within a political
subdivision to residential use only, claiming that the state was depriv-
ing him of a property right without due process of law.' 4 The Court
11. See infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Young decision
which raises this question; see also Note, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: Creating
Levels of Protected Expression, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 321, 357 (1977).
12. 452 U.S. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
13. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). "This question involves the validity ... of... zoning legisla-
tion .... Upon that question this Court has not thus far spoken." Id at 390.
14. Id at 384.
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upheld the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the police power.' 5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the local legislative
body had conducted an extensive investigation of the local situation
before deciding that the ordinance was necessary.16 The Court, there-
fore, abstained from further review, holding: "If the validity of the leg-
islative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment must be allowed to control."' 7 The Court stated
that, absent a showing by the aggrieved party that the ordinance was
"clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare," the zoning power
was to prevail.'" The Euclid Court thus explicitly established that zon-
ing ordinances, as legislative acts, should not be entirely overturned
unless clearly demonstrated to be arbitrary and unreasonable. That
holding became the basis for the enduring doctrine that zoning ordi-
nances enjoy a special presumption of validity.
It is important to note that the right allegedly infringed by the zon-
ing ordinance in Euclid was aproperty right. Property rights are not
among the fundamental rights which receive special constitutional pro-
tection.'9 Accordingly, the Euclid Court confined its inquiry to the ele-
15. Id at 397.
16. Id at 394.
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of commissions and
experts, and the results of their investigations have been set forth in comprehensive
reports. These reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration,
concur in the view that the segregation of residential, business, and industrial
buildings will [serve to promote the public welfare] ....
Id
17. Id at 388 (citations omitted).
18. Id at 395.
19. The Supreme Court has developed a multi-tier approach to the review of state ordi-
nances attacked under the due process and equal protection clauses to the fourteenth
amendment. Where a fundamental right (such as the right to vote or freedom of speech) or
a suspect class (such as a racial minority) is affected, the Court applies the so-called strict
scrutiny test. Under this test the Government has the significant burden of showing that the
state's interest is compelling and that no less intrusive means of promoting that interest are
available. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("the Equal Protection Clause
demands that racial classifications. . . be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny' ") (quoting
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-
62 (1964) ("the right of sufferage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society
.. . [hence] any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized").
If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is implicated by the statute, the Court
applies the less rigorous rational basis or reasonable relationship test. Under that standard
of review, the statute is presumed constitutional and will not be overturned unless the party
attacking the statute demonstrates that it is arbitrary and unreasonable. Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938). The Court will uphold such a classification if it can hypothesize that it was based
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mentary question of whether the ordinance was reasonably related to a
legitimate state purpose. The ordinance readily passed muster under
this limited standard of review. Because zoning power is merely an
aspect of the police power, any zoning ordinance which infringed upon
a fundamental right, in principle, should be subject to the most rigor-
ous standard of judicial review.20 However, on the few occasions sub-
sequent to Euclid that the Court has reviewed an exercise of the zoning
power, the Court has customarily applied only minimal scrutiny even
where fundamental rights were arguably implicated.21 Such continual
deference to legislative judgment logically implies that the presumption
of validity accorded zoning legislation is especially difficult to
overcome.
B. The Zoning Power and the First Amendment
While Euclid settled the question of the constitutionality of gen-
eral zoning ordinances,' the more difficult question of how and under
what circumstances the first amendment protection limits a commu-
nity's exercise of the zoning power was not considered by the Court
until forty-eight years later. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 23 the
Court reviewed a zoning ordinance enacted by a small residential com-
munity which limited the number of unrelated persons who could re-
side in a single household.24 A number of unrelated students who were
leasing a house in the Village challenged the provision on the ground,
inter alia, that the zoning ordinance impermissibly burdened the exer-
"upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or differ-
ence in state policy. . . ." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1950).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 996 (1978).
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26 (1954); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603
(1927). In a recent case, however, a plurality of the Court recognized that the zoning ordi-
nance in question burdened the exercise of a fundamental right; accordingly, the Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny analysis. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976) (four
justices concluding that zoning ordinance that expressly prohibited certain relatives from
living together, impermissibly infringed upon fundamental privacy rights). For a detailed
discussion of the presumption of validity in the zoning context, see Note, Freedom of Expres-
sion in the Land Use Planning Context Preserving the Barrier of Presumptive Validity, 28 U.
FLA. L. Rrv. 954 (1976); see infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
23. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
24. Id at 2. "The word 'family' as used in the ordinance means '[o]ne or more persons
related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeep-
ing unit. . . . A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be
deemed to constitute a family."' Id
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cise of their fundamental first amendment right of freedom of
association.25
In a terse response to this claim, the Court stated simply that "[t]he
ordinance places no ban on. . .forms of association, for a 'family'
may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it
likes."' 26 Because, by hypothesis, "no 'fundamental' right guaranteed
by the Constitution"' 27 was involved, the ordinance retained the pre-
sumption of validity "historically' 28 recognized by the Court. The
Court emphasized the broad scope of the zoning power, explaining that
"[t]he police power [to zone] is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." 29 By rejecting the freedom of
association challenge by judicial fiat, as distinguished from principled
analysis, the Court continued to demonstrate enormous deference to
the zoning power, even when fundamental rights were arguably
implicated.
In a dissent in Belle Terre, Justice Marshall criticized the Court's
deference to the zoning power in the face of the ordinance's burden on
a fundamental right. He accepted the premise that "zoning is a com-
plex and important function of the State" and that "[it may indeed be
the most essential function performed by local government. 30 In addi-
tion, he accepted the Euclid principle that "deference should be given
to governmental judgments concerning proper land-use allocation. '31
He insisted, however, that "deference does not mean abdication. This
Court has an obligation to ensure that zoning ordinances, even when
adopted in furtherance of. . .legitimate aims, do not infringe upon
fundamental constitutional rights."32 Justice Marshall went on to urge
that the ordinance reached beyond land use control and impermissibly
regulated "the way people choose to associate with each other within
the privacy of their own homes. 33 Because the ordinance infringed the
appellants' fundamental rights of association and privacy, and because
25. Id at 7, 13.
26. Id at 9.
27. Id at 7. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) the Court defined the
fundamental right of association as the "freedom to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas."
28. Id at 8.
29. Id at 9.
30. Id at 13.
31. Id
32. Id at 14.
33. Id at 17.
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there was no showing that the ordinance was necessary to promote a
compelling state interest, the provision was unconstitutional in Justice
Marshall's view." Justice Marshall suggested that "the village continue
to pursue those [legitimate] purposes but by means of more carefully
drawn and evenhanded legislation."35
Although the majority opinion in Belle Terre reinforced the strong
policy of deference towards the zoning power, Justice Marshall's dis-
sent laid a well-reasoned foundation for a future first amendment chal-
lenge. Such a challenge reached the Court two years later, in 1976, in
Young v. American Mini Theatres. 36 Young was "the first case in [the
Supreme] Court in which the interests in free expression protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments [had] been implicated by a mu-
nicipality's commercial zoning ordinances. 37 The controversy in-
volved the city of Detroit's effort to prevent or ameliorate
neighborhood deterioration by regulating the location of, inter alia,
"adult" theaters.38 Based upon a legislative finding that certain land
uses were injurious to a neighborhood when concentrated within a lim-
ited area,39 Detroit enacted comprehensive zoning legislation which re-
quired certain specific land uses, including adult theaters and
bookstores, to be physically dispersed.4
Local adult bookstore and theater owners challenged the zoning
ordinances on the grounds that (1) the ordinances were void for vague-
ness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; (2) the
ordinances constituted invalid prior restraints on protected communi-
cation; and (3) the classification of theaters on the basis of the adult
content of their exhibitions violated the equal protection clause.4
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, a five-to-four majority of
the Court upheld the ordinance, although one of the five, Justice Pow-
ell, explicitly rejected the equal protection analysis.4 2 Five members of
34. Id at 18.
35. Id at 20.
36. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
37. Id at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id at 52.
39. Id at 54 n.6.
40. Id at 52. The ordinance prohibited an adult theater from being located within 1000
feet of any two other "regulated uses." Id "Regulated uses" included adult establishments
such as bookstores and motion picture theaters that emphasized or depicted "Specified Sex-
ual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas." Id at 53, nn.4 & 5.
41. Id at 58.
42. Justice Powell was the fifth member in favor of upholding the ordinance, but he
stated: "[M]y approach to the resolution of this case is sufficiently different to prompt me to
write separately." Id at 73.
1982]
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the Court supported Justice Stevens' rejection of the vagueness chal-
lenge.43 The same majority joined in Justice Stevens' conclusion that
the ordinance was not an impermissible prior restraint on protected ex-
pression.' Justice Stevens pointed out that neither exhibitors nor the
public were denied access to purvey or view the expression in question.
He reasoned that the ordinances did not impose a limit "on the total
number of adult theaters which may operate in the city of Detroit
... . Viewed as an entity, the market for this commodity is essentially
unrestrained."45 Detroit's strong interest in preventing urban decay,
therefore, justified the regulation of theplace where such films may be
exhibited.46
Four members of the majority viewed the central issue in Young as
whether the classification by adult content was "consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause."'47 Using a novel analysis,4 8 the plurality de-
clared that the legislative classification treating adult theaters differ-
ently from other theaters did not deny the adult theater owners equal
protection. Their argument was based upon the assertion that "even
though. . . the First Amendment will not tolerate total suppression of
erotic materials that have some arguable artistic value, it is manifest
that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled polit-
ical debate. .... ,49 Having determined that the right burdened by the
43. Id at 58-61. Justice Powell joined that part of the Court's opinion which rejected
the vagueness and prior restraint challenges. Id at 73.
44. Id at 62-63. The Court has long disfavored governmental restraint of expression
prior to its publication or exhibition because of the possibility that valid expression will be
directly suppressed or inhibited by inducing caution in the speaker before a determination
that the expression is unprotected. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S,
546, 558 (1975); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The doctrine of prior restraint
does not afford absolute protection to first amendment speech, but any system of prior re-
straint bears a strong presumption of unconstitutionality. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
45. 427 U.S. at 62.
46. Id at 62-63.
47. Id at 63. Justice Powell did not join this part of the Court's opinion. Id. at 73 n. 1.
Thus, the controversial equal protection analysis represents the opinion of only a four mem-
ber plurality.
48. The novelty of the analysis lies in its suggestion that nonobscene adult entertainment
is entitled to less protection under the first amendment than other forms of speech and ex-
pression. Id at 70; see Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Lees of
Protected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 321, 357 (1977).
49. 427 U.S. at 70. Also, earlier in the opinion discussing vagueness, Justice Stevens
stated: "[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is
on the border line between pornography and artistic expression. than in the free dissemina-
tion of ideas of social and political significance . I..." d at 61.
[Vol. 15
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ordinances was not as important as fundamental first amendment
rights of political or philosophical expression, the plurality held that
the classification by adult content did not deny equal protection if the
expression in question was not totally supressed.5 Justice Stevens'
completed the analysis by reasoning that Detroit's "interest in preserv-
ing the character of its neighborhoods" amply justified the differential
treatment of adult theaters. 1
Justice Powell concurred in the Young judgment but did not join
in Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis. 2 He did not share the
plurality's view that nonobscene erotic materials may be treated differ-
ently under the first amendment than other forms of expression: 3 In-
stead, he thought it appropriate to weigh the competing interests as the
Court had done in United States v. O'Brien. 14 The O'Brien Court had
declared that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limita-
tions on First Amendment freedoms." 5 Justice Powell in Young
recognized that "[t]he factual distinctions between . . . O'Brien and
this case are substantial, but the essential weighing and balancing of
50. Id Justice Stevens stated: "Even though the First Amendment protects communica-
tion in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the
content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from
other motion pictures." Id at 70-7 1.
51. Justice Stevens did not explicitly disclose which level of equal protection analysis he
employed. However, because he notes that society's interest in protecting sexually explicit
material is "of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate," it appears that he was applying some intermediate and less demanding
standard of review than traditional strict scrutiny. Id For a lower court's interpretation of
Stevens' equal expression analysis, see Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696,
700 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (holding that an ordinance similar to Detroit's, which had the practical
effect of suppressing the exhibition of adult entertainment, was invalid under the first
amendment).
52. 427 U.S. at 73.
53. Id at 73 n.1. "I do not think we need reach, nor am I inclined to agree with, the
holding . . . that nonobscene, erotic materials may be treated differently under First
Amendment principles from other forms of protected expression." Id
54. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien involved the criminal prosecution of a draft card
burner. The Court applied a four-part test to determine whether the government could limit
conduct involving both speech and nonspeech. Under that test a government regulation is
sufficiently justified, despite its incidental impact upon first amendment interests, "if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction. . . on alleged First Amendment Freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id at 377.
55. Id at 376 (emphasis added).
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competing interests are the same."56
Applying this balancing test to the facts in Young, Justice Powell
determined that the ordinance operated to silence no message, invoked
no censorship, and imposed no limitation upon those who wished to
view adult movies.57 He then concluded that the "degree of incidental
encroachment upon such expression was the minimum necessary to
further the purpose of the ordinance," and that the need to prevent
urban decay clearly justified the ordinance .5  Thus, under Justice Pow-
ell's analysis, the City's strong and legitmate interest outweighed the
"incidental and minimal ' 59 burden on the first amendment right.
The fundamental division of the Young Court on the issue of the
differential treatment of adult theaters and bookstores was evinced by
the four dissenters6" who regarded the majority's treatment of the case
as a "drastic departure from established principles of First Amendment
law."61 Justice Stewart, writing for the dissent, argued that "[t]he kind
of expression at issue here is no doubt objectionable to some, but that
does not diminish its protected status ... ,62 In his view, a "prime
function of the First Amendment is to guard against [selective] interfer-
ence" with expression "whose content is thought [by some] to produce
distasteful effects."6 Articulating the traditional rationale underlying
the first amendment, Justice Stewart warned:
The Court must never forget that the consequences of rigor-
ously enforcing the guarantees of the First Amendment are
frequently unpleasant. Much speech that seems to be of little
or no value will enter the market place of ideas, threatening
the quality of our social discourse and, more generally, the
serenity of our lives. But that is the price to be paid for con-
stitutional freedom. 4
56. 427 U.S. at 80. For a well reasoned argument that Justice Powell misapplied the
O'Brien test, see Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theatres and the First Amendment. An Approach
to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HoFsTRA L. REv. 379, 398-400 (1977).
57. 427 U.S. at 78.
58. Id at 81-82. Justice Powell also stated: "It is clear both from the chronology and
from the facts that Detroit has not embarked on an effort to suppress free expression." ld at
80. Thus, the fact that Detroit had acted in good faith to solve a serious problem helped
justify the regulation of adult theaters.
59. Id at 78.
60. Justice Stewart wrote in dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun.
See id at 84. Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate dissent. See id at 88.
61. Id at 84.
62. Id at 85.
63. Id
64. Id at 88.
Vol. 15
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Absent a judicial determination of obscenity, it was not clear to Justice
Stewart that the speech involved was less "important" than other forms
of speech.6" Thus, the dissent could "only interpret. . . [the] decision
as an aberration."
66
In Young, the Court again accorded great deference to the zoning
power, this time in the face of a direct first amendment challenge. The
willingness of at least four Justices to advocate a narrowing of the
scope of first amendment protection in a zoning context 67 suggests that
the zoning power had assumed a new and stronger position as against
nonpolitical rights of free expression. The importance of the fundamen-
tal rights at stake, the sharply conflicting opinions, and the lack of a
consistent rationale rendered Young a confusing precedent in need of
clarification. In 1981, the facts in Schad presented the Court with an
opportunity to do just that.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
At the time of the zoning violation in question, the Borough of
Mount Ephraim (Borough), Camden County, New Jersey, was a mu-
nicipality entrusted with zoning reponsibilities. 68 The Borough's zon-
ing ordinance provided for four commercial zones, including the one at
issue along Black Horse Pike (Black Horse Pike commercial zone).69
The remainder of the community was zoned for residential use.7" Sec-
tion 99-15B of the ordinance described the specific uses permitted in a
commercial zone.7 ' Section 99-4 provided that "[a]l uses not expressly
65. Id at 87.
66. Id
67. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
68. 452 U.S. at 76.
69. Id. at 81 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment only). Section 99-15A of the
MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J. CODE states the purpose of the commercial zone as follows:
A. Purpose. The purpose of this district is to provide areas for local and regional
commercial operations. The zone district pattern recognizes the strip commercial
pattern which exists along Kings Highway and the Black Horse Pike. It is in-
tended, however, to encourage such existing uses and any new uses or redevelop-
ment to improve upon the zoning districts of greater depth, by encouraging
shopping center-type development with buildings related to each other in design,
landscaping and site planning, and by requiring off-street parking, controlled in-
gress and egress, greater building set backs, buffer areas along property lines adja-
cent to residential uses, and a concentration of commercial uses into fewer
locations to eliminate the strip pattern.
Id at 63 n.2.
70. Id at 63 n.1, 81 n.3.
71. Id. at 63. Section 99-15B of the MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J. CODE described the permit-
ted uses in a commercial zone as follows:
B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings..
(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down
1982]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA4W REVIEW [
permitted in this chapter are prohibited."72 No form of entertainment
was expressly permitted.7" At least three establishments located in the
Black Horse Pike commercial zone, however, offered some form of live
entertainment,74 and there was apparently a commercial movie theater
operating within the zone as well.75
In 1973, appellants (bookstore owners) opened an adult bookstore
within the Black Horse Pike commercial zone.76 In addition to selling
adult books, magazines, and films, the store exhibited adult films in
coin-operated private booths pursuant to a license issued by the Bor-
ough.17 In 1976, the bookstore owners'added a coin-operated mecha-
nism which exhibited a live dancer (usually nude) behind a glass
panel.78 Thereafter, the Borough filed complaints against the book-
store owners, charging, inter alia, that the exhibition of live dancing
within the Black Horse Pike commercial zone violated section 99-15B
of the Mount Ephraim zoning ordinance.79
The bookstore owners were found guilty and fined in the munici-
pal court.8 0 Their appeal to the Camden County Court resulted in a
trial de novo on the municipal court record, at which the bookstore
owners were again found guilty.8' The county court construed the or-
dinance as prohibiting all live entertainment in any establishment
within the Black Horse Pike commercial zone.82 The bookstore owners
contended, inter alia, that the ordinance was being selectively and im-
properly enforced against them in that the Borough permitted other
dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as
but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jew-
elry, paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, li-
quors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes
and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores;
and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of four (4) stores or
more without additional parking, provided the offices do not exceed the equivalent
of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the stores.
(2) Motels.
Id
72. Id. at 64 (quoting MouNr EPHRAIM, N.J. CODE section 99-4).
73. Id at 81 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Id at 64 n.3.
75. Id at 82 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id at 62.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id at 63. The bookstore owners were also charged with other violations, which they
successfully defended in the state courts, in connection with the repainting of their exterior
sign. Id. at 82 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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establishments in the Black Horse Pike commercial zone to exhibit live
entertainment. 3 The county court rejected that argument, holding that
other live entertainment establishments were permitted nonconforming
uses that had existed prior to the passage of the ordinance. 4
The county court also ruled that the bookstore owners' first
amendment rights had not been violated. 5 Relying on Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 86 this court reasoned that first amendment guaran-
tees were not involved because this case involved solely a zoning
ordinance that simply forbade live entertainment in any form." The
Appellate Division of the Superior Court affirmed, and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey denied further review.88
The bookstore owners appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.89 The Court reversed and remanded, holding that the imposi-
tion of criminal penalties under an ordinance that prohibited all live
entertainment violated the bookstore owners' right of free expression
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution."
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A4. Justice White's Opinionfor the Court
Presented with a number of claims on appeal, the majority chose
to resolve the controversy in Schad on first amendment grounds.9 The
Court's analysis began with a determination that the Supreme Court
was bound by the New Jersey state court's construction of the zoning
ordinance;92 as construed, live entertainment including nude dancing,
was not a permitted use in any establishment within the Borough.93
The Court observed that by excluding all live entertainment, the zoning
ordinance by its terms prohibited "a wide range of expression that has
83. Id
84. Id at 64 n.3.
85. Id at 64.
86. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Young.
87. 452 U.S. at 64-65.
88. Id at 65.
89. Id
90. 452 U.S. at 65.
91. "Appellants also contend that the zoning ordinance, as applied to them, violates due
process and equal protection .... Since we sustain appellants' First Amendment challenge
to the ordinance, we do not address these additional claims." Id. at 65 n.4.
92. The Court observed that "the Mount Ephraim Code has been construed by the New
Jersey courts - a construction that is binding upon us .. " Id at 65.
93. IZd
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long been held to be within the protections of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."94 The Court pointed out that many forms of entertain-
ment, "as well as political and ideological speech," are protected by the
first amendment.95 It further noted that "nude dancing is not without
its First Amendment protections from official regulation. 96
The Court next established that "'[b]ecause overbroad laws, like
vague ones, deter privileged activit[ies],' "97 the bookstore owners could
rely on the impact of the ordinance upon the expressive activities of
others-as well as their own-to establish their standing. 91 Because the
ordinance impacted upon the rights of anyone who wished to view or
exhibit live entertainment, the bookstore owners clearly had standing
to raise an overbreadth challenge.
99
From the broad premise that the zoning ordinance excluded a
wide range of protected expression, the Court proceeded to analyze the
issue relying on settled first amendment principles. The Court asserted
that, while the zoning power was "undoubtedly broad," it "'must be
94. Id
95. The Court cited numerous cases in support of this proposition, listing them so as to
trace the chronological development of first amendment protection of entertainment: Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (expression by means of motion pic-
tures was held to be within the protections of the first and fourteenth amendments); Schacht
v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61-63 (1970) (a dramatic skit performed on the street to protest
the Viet Nam war held to be protected); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (mo-
tion pictures depicting nudity held to be protected under the first amendment); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561-62 (1975) (live drama depicting nudity held
to be a protected form of expression); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217
(1975) (motion pictures depicting nudity held protected under the first amendment); Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (live topless dancing held to be protected under the
first amendment); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (nonobscene topless and
bottomless dancing found to be within the constitutional protection of freedom of
expression).
96. 452 U.S. at 66 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972)).
97. 452 U.S. at 66 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)).
98. 452 U.S. at 66. For a definition of the first amendment overbreadth doctrine, see
supra note 7; see also 427 U.S. at 59 n.17 (overbreadth doctrine gives standing even to par-
ties whose own speech may not be protected). The theory underlying the expanded standing
for challenges under the overbreadth doctrine is that when a statute allegedly prohibits
speech, even arguably protected speech, the possible inhibitory effects wreak harm through-
out society. 427 U.S. at 59 n.17.
99. 452 U.S. at 66. The Court's approach to the controversy focused upon all live
entertainment.
Whatever First Amendment protection should be extended to nude dancing, live or
on film. . . the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits all live entertainment in the
Borough: no property in the Borough may be principally used for the commercial
production of live entertainment.
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exercised within constitutional limits.' ,'o Accordingly, even the zon-
ing power is subject to judicial review and "the standard of review is
determined by the nature of the right. . . threatened. . . rather than
by the power being exercised . - "1o1 Because the challenged ordi-
nance threatened the constitutionally guaranteed right of free expres-
sion, the Court stated that it must "scrutinize both the interests
advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on protected expres-
sion and the means chosen to further those interests.""1 2
Before proceeding to scrutinize the Borough's ordinance, the
Court thought it necessary to distinguish Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc. 103 It characterized Young as a case in which first amendment
rights were only minimally burdened by the zoning power. 104 The ordi-
nance in Young, the Court explained, regulated the location of adult
theaters but did not exclude them. 05 Furthermore, in Young, the City
of Detroit had produced evidence to show that the concentration of
adult theaters led to deterioration of surrounding neighborhoods and
thereby had "justified the incidental burden on First Amendment inter-
ests resulting from merely dispersing, but not excluding adult
theaters." I" 6
The Schad Court determined that the Borough of Mount
Ephraim, on the other hand, had not justified its broad exclusion of
protected expression. First, the Borough had introduced no evidence to
support its contention that live entertainment would conflict with its
plan to create a commercial zone limited to providing for its residents'
immediate needs.'07 The Court pointed out that the diverse commer-
cial uses which the ordinance expressly permitted belied any such
plan. 108
100. Id at 68 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)).
101. 452 U.S. at 68 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945)).
102. 452 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
103. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
104. Id at 71.
105. Id; see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying. text.
106. 452 U.S. at 72.
107. Id The Borough had argued that the ordinance was designed to provide a limited
commercial zone that would enable residents "to purchase at local stores the few items they
occasionally forgot to buy outside the Borough." Id at 72 & n.13.
108. Id at 72-73. The Court stated:
The range of permitted uses goes far beyond providing for the 'immediate needs' of
the residents. Motels, hardware stores, lumber stores, banks, offices, and car show-
rooms are permitted in commercial zones. The list of permitted 'retail stores' is
nonexclusive, and it includes such services as beauty salons, barber shops, cleaners,
and restaurants. Virtually the only item or service that may not be sold in a corn-
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Second, the Court observed that the Borough had produced no
evidence to support its assertion that live entertainment could selec-
tively be excluded to prevent or ameliorate urban problems attributable
to that form of expression. 1°9 Absent such evidence, the Court main-
tained that "it is not immediately apparent as a matter of experience,
that live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant
than those associated with various permitted uses . ,, 11 Third,
the Court held that even if there were special problems uniquely associ-
ated with live entertainment, the Borough had failed to establish that
its interest in dealing with those problems "could not be met by restric-
tions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression."' '
Finally, the Court rejected the Borough's contention that section
99-15B was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction." 2 Ac-
cording to the majority, in order to support such a contention, the
Borough first would have to show that live entertainment was "'basi-
cally incompatible with normal activity"' in the commercial zones."
3
Because the Borough had permitted a number of commercial uses and
had failed to show how live entertainment was incompatible with them,
the zoning restriction was unreasonable.' 
1 4
A second requisite of a valid time, place, and manner restriction,
under the majority analysis, is that it "leave open adequate alternative
channels of communication."' "5 By excluding all live entertainment,
including nude dancing, the Borough had closed off all alternative
channels for the communication of those forms of expression. The
Court refused to accept Mount Ephraim's argument that live entertain-
ment, including live nude dancing, was amply available outside the
mercial zone is entertainment. The Borough's first justification is patently
insufficient.
Id
109. Id at 73. The Borough had contended that it could ban live entertainment for the
normal reasons supporting zoning in a commercial district, viz, to prevent parking, trash,
police protection, and medical facility problems. Id
110. Id
111. Id at 74 (emphasis added).
112. Id If a particular form of expression is protected by the first amendment, it may be
limited only by reasonable regulations as to the time, place, or manner of the expression
where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on time of picketing, during school
hours, found reasonable); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban onplace of demonstra-
tion, near courthouse, found reasonable); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ban on
manner of communication, by means of sound truck, found reasonable).
113. 452 U.S. at 75 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 116).
114. Id
115. Id at 75-76.
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limits of the Borough.1 16 The Court noted that the lower courts had
made no findings regarding such outside availability. 117 In the absence
of such findings, the Court reiterated the traditional rule that "'one is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place."' "18 Thus, in the majority's view, the Borough had failed tojus-
tify its overbroad restriction on an admittedly protected form of
expression.
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence
Justice Blackmun joined in Justice White's opinion but wrote sep-
arately to address two points. First, he took the position, consonant
with Justice Marshall's position in Belle Terre, 119 that there is no pre-
sumption of validity for the zoning power when the first amendment is
implicated.1 20
Justice Blackmun's second point addressed the most controversial
aspect of Schad: "the suggestion that a local community should be free
to eliminate a particular form of expression so long as that form is
available in areas reasonably nearby."'121 He did not read the Court's
opinion as reaching such a conclusion, nor did he endorse it. 122 He
emphasized that, although Young upheld the reasonable regulation of a
protected form of expression within a political subdivision, under the
facts of Young, access to the protected expression was preserved within
the subdivision.123 Justice Blackmun asserted that an individual's right
to free expression should not depend upon the availability of that ex-
pression in a nearby community in which the individual has no polit-
ical voice.' 24 He concluded with the admonition that the Court is
obliged under the first amendment to protect "minorities against the
'standardization of ideas.., by... dominant political or community
116. d at 76.
117. Id
118. Id at 76-77 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
119. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Marshall's
dissent in Belle Terra
120. 452 U.S. at 77 (Blackmun, 3., concurring). Justice Blackmun emphasized "that the
presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local government's exercise of the zoning
power carries little, if any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expres-
sion protected under the First Amendment." Id
121. Id at 77-78.
122. I.d at 77-79.
123. Id at 78. "[Ihe city of Detroit... preserved reasonable access to the regulated
form of expression within the boundaries f that same subdivision." Id (emphasis added).
124. Id
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groups.' "125
C. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, agreed with Justice
White's overbreadth analysis, thereby creating a majority in support of
resolving the controversy on first amendment grounds. 126 Justice Pow-
ell wrote separately, however, to announce an unprecedented view.
Without expressly articulating a rationale or marshalling authority,
Justice Powell contended that a residential community that had ex-
cluded or severely limited commercial use should be allowed, by means
of a carefully drawn ordinance, to "regulate or ban all commercial
public entertainment."'
1 27
D. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Schad "without en-
dorsing the overbreadth analysis employed by the Court .. ,12 For
Justice Stevens, the outcome of the case turned upon the allocation of
the burden of persuasion. If it were clear from the record that this was
"a simple attempt by a small residential community to exclude the
commercial exploitation of nude dancing from a 'setting of tranquil-
ity,' "129 he would compel the bookstore owners to overcome the usual
presumption of validity. He found, however, the text of the ordinance
ambiguous and the factual record unclear as to what type of commer-
cial zone actually existed in Mount Ephraim.130 Thus, the situation in
Schad, as revealed in the factual record, could not properly be charac-
terized as a simple zoning controversy.
Justice Stevens concluded that because "the record is opaque"
and, assuming that live nude dancing is in some manner protected by
the first amendment, "the Borough must shoulder the burden of dem-
onstrating that appellants' introduction of live entertainment had an
identifiable adverse impact on the neighborhood or on the Borough as
a whole." 3' Neither the text of the ordinance nor the facts in the rec-
125. Id at 79 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)).
126. Id at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. Id
128. Id at 84-85 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Id at 79.
130. Id at 80. Justice Stevens observed that "[w]ithout more information about this com-
mercial enclave..., one cannot know whether the change in appellants' business in 1976
introduced cacophony into a tranquil setting or merely a new refrain in a local replica of
Place Pigalle." Id at 83.
131. Id at 83.
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ord convinced Justice Stevens that the Borough had met this burden. 32
Accordingly, the bookstore owners' conviction under such circum-
stances could not stand.
In a footnote, Justice Stevens expressed complete agreement with
Justice Powell's view that a residential community could regulate or
ban commercial public entertainment: 3 3 "Surely, a municipality zoned
entirely for residential use need not create a special commercial zone
solely to accommodate purveyors of entertainment."'1
34
E. Chief Justice Burger's Dissent
Chief Justice Burger rejected the Court's overbreadth analysis,
viewing Schad as "nothing more than a variation on [the] theme"'
' 35 of
earlier zoning cases like Belle Terre. 136 He characterized Mount
Ephraim as a small, "placid, 'bedroom' community"'137 that should be
free to zone in accordance with its citizens' "conception of the 'decent
life.' "138 To him, it was clear that "the citizens of the Borough of
Mount Ephraim meant only to preserve the basic character of their
community."'139 He maintained that "by thrusting their live nude danc-
ing shows on this community the appellants alter and damage that
community over [the community's] objections."' 4 ° Thus, the ordi-
nance, "[a]s applied in this case," operates only to prevent such damage
and is therefore valid. 141
Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger argued: "Even assuming that
the 'expression' manifested in the nude dancing that is involved here is
somehow protected speech. . .,the Borough. . .[may] regulate it."' 42
Citing Young, he asserted that such regulation imposed only "a mini-
mal intrusion on genuine rights of expression"' 43 because this kind of
entertainment was available in nearby, "more sophisticated cities."'"
In his opinion, "[t]o say that there is a First Amendment right to im-
132. Id at 84.
133. Id at 84 n.l1.
134. Id
135. Id at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. 416 U.S. 1. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
holding in Belle Terre.
137. 452 U.S. it 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. Id at 87.




143. Id at 87.
144. Id
1982]
LOYO_,L OF LOS ANGELES LW REVIEW V
pose every form of expression on every community, including the kind
of 'expression' involved here, is sheer nonsense."'
145
V. ANALYSIS
A. .A Response to Young?
Relying on Young, the New Jersey courts "sought 'to avoid or meet
the first amendment issue only by declaring that the restriction on the
use of appellants' property was contained in a zoning ordinance that
excluded all live entertainment from the Borough, including live nude
dancing."' 146 Such an expansive interpretation of the zoning power, at
the expense of free expression, illustrates the potential for misapplica-
tion inherent in Young.
The state courts' reading of Young, and a perceived need to define
clearly the first amendment's relationship to the zoning power, may ex-
plain why the Schad Court elected to dispose of the case on first
amendment grounds rather than on available alternative grounds. 147 It
may also explain the Court's analytical approach.148 Instead of focus-
ing on the ordinance as specifically applied to the bookstore owners,
the majority reviewed the facial constitutionality of the zoning ordi-
nance. The Court determined that "[blecause appellants' claims are
rooted in the First Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact
of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their
own."' 149 The Court was able to recognize the bookstore owners' stand-
ing to raise a facial overbreadth claim because it had determined that
the ordinance, by its own terms, completely prohibited a wide range of
expression: all live entertainment. 150
145. Id at 88.
146. Id at 67-68.
147. Id at 65 n.4. The bookstore owners argued that the ordinance, as applied to them,
abridged rights to due process and equal protection because it was arbitrary and irrational in
prohibiting live nude dancing, while allowing the exhibition of films containing nude danc-
ing. Id Because the Court sustained the owners' first amendment challenge, it did not
reach these additional claims. Id; see, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928) (specific application of a residential-only use restriction to appellant's industrial land
found arbitrary and unreasonable and thus did not promote the public health, safety, morals
or welfare).
148. The Court eschewed the narrower "as applied" method of review, which "allows the
law to operate where it might do so constitutionally and vindicates a claimant who shows
that his own conduct is within the first amendment and cannot be burdened in the manner
attempted." See Note, The First 4mendment Operbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 844,
844 (1970).
149. 452 U.S. at 66 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)).
150. The Court's determination that the ordinance impacted upon a wide range of ex-
pression is crucial, Without such a determination, the overbreadth analysis, which ulti-
[ ol. 15
SCHAD v. BORO UGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM
In addition to facilitating an overbreadth analysis, the focus on the
ordinance's exclusion of all live entertainment had two other crucial
effects upon the disposition of the issue. First, the finding of an impact
upon a broad category of expression brought into consideration a for-
midable body of first amendment law concerning the protection of en-
tertainment. 5 ' Armed with this precedent, the Court could posit
authoritatively that entertainment, including live entertainment, isfull
protected under the first amendment. By contrast, a narrower analysis
of the ordinance as applied would have brought into consideration a
narrower line of precedent concerning the protection of live nude danc-
ing.152 The three cases supporting the protection of live nude danc-
ing153 do not expressly state the degree of protection to be afforded that
form of expression. Young, however, expressly limits the amount of
protection to be extended adult entertainment. 154 Hence, Young would
have limited the effectiveness of an argument contending that live nude
dancing, as a form of adult entertainment, is fully protected under the
first amendment.
Once the Court established that the expression prohibited by the
ordinance enjoyed such full protection, there was a strong basis for ap-
plying strict scrutiny.' 55 Thus, the Court's analytical approach appro-
priately enabled it to overcome the presumption of validity
traditionally accorded zoning ordinances and shift the burden ofjustifi-
cation to the Borough.156 When read in conjunction with Justice
Blackmun's concurrence, 57 this aspect of the majority opinion seems to
be an unequivocal rejection of the presumptive validity of those zoning
ordinances that impact upon the exercise of protected first amendment
mately disposed of the case in the bookstore owners' favor, would have been inapplicable.
"[I]f the statute's deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not 'both real and substantial,'
and if the statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts'... the
litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third parties." Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 60 (citation omitted).
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. The ordinance, as applied to the bookstore owners, prohibited only live nude danc-
ing. Three earlier Supreme Court cases held that live nude dancing is a protected form of
expression. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Southeastern Promotions Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
153. See supra note 152.
154. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
155. 452 U.S. at 68-69. The Court maintained that the right to free expression, being a
fundamental ight, required heightened judicial protection under the due process clause. Id;
see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
156. "As is true of other ordinances, when a zoning law infringes upon a protected lib-
erty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government inter-
est." 452 U.S. at 68.
157. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
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rights. The state courts' use of Young to sustain the exercise of the
zoning power in Schad seems clearly disapproved.158
That the majority opinion is a response to Young's failure to define
clearly the relationship between fundamental rights and the zoning
power is also evident from its discussion of that decision. The Schad
Court stated explicitly that "this case [Schad] is not controlled by
Young v. American Mini Theatres, the decision relied upon by the Cam-
den County Court."' 59 It distinguished Young as a case where first
amendment rights were only incidentally and minimally implicated by
the zoning ordinance. 6 ' The fact that the challenged ordinance in
Young did not operate to exclude expression, but merely regulated its
location, was emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic.' 6' The im-
plication is that, while Young may authorize reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions of certain protected expression, the total exclusion
of that expression will not be tolerated. Hence, the exclusion of pro-
tected expression should be permitted only in certain limited circum-
stances analogous to those previously recognized by the Court.
62
B. Problems with the Overbreadth Analysis
The overbreadth analysis in Schad left unresolved a specific ques-
tion about adult entertainment. The Court asserted that prior case law
in nonzoning contexts establishes as a general principle that nonob-
scene commercial entertainment enjoys full protection as a form of
speech under the first amendment.163 Young, however, raised a serious
question concerning the degree of first amendment protection to be af-
forded adult entertainment in a zoning context.'64
Although the facts in Schad presented an opportunity to resolve
158. As noted by Justice Blackmun, after the Schad decision, "it should be clear that
where First Amendment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no such 'talismanic
immunity from constitutional challenge."' 452 U.S. at 77 (quoting Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 75 (Powell, J., concurring)).
159. 452 U.S. at 71.
160. Id at 71 n.10.
161. Id at 71.
162. "Any system of prior restraint... 'comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity."' Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 558 (1975) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). The Court
has tolerated prior restraints of expression only in extreme situations: to protect national
security during wartime, to prevent the publication of obscene material, to protect a a local
community from incitements to violence, and to prevent the forceful overthrow of the gov-
ernment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (threat of future libelous publica-
tions insufficient to justify prior restraint on newspaper publication). See also supra note 44.
163. See supra note 95.
164. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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that question, the Court avoided this issue by focusing on the ordi-
nance's prohibition of all live entertainment, instead of the Borough's
application of the ordinance to suppress live nude dancing. 65
Moreover, while examining the ordinance's impact on the expres-
sive activities of others, the Court was silent as to whether the impact
upon the bookstore owners' activity, alone, would have been sufficient
to sustain the challenge.' 66 This silence, when read in light of Justice
Stevens' and Chief Justice Burger's direct assertions that the adult en-
tertainment deserves less protection than other forms of expression, 167
suggests that impact upon adult entertainment alone may not have
been enough to invalidate the ordinance. By omitting to rule expressly
on the degree of protection to be extended adult entertainment gener-
ally, the Court perpetuated the lingering inference engendered by
Young that there may be varying levels of first amendment protection
of various forms of expression.
68
Another problem with the Schad Court's overbreadth analysis is
that it created conflicting inferences as to the scope of the holding,
thereby inviting qualifying comments by several of the Justices.' 69 The
majority opinion called for close judicial review even for zoning ordi-
nances which "only incidentally" restrict freedom of expression. 170
Through its treatment of Young, the majority also indicates that com-
plete exclusion of protected expression will not be tolerated for the
same reasons which might justify restricting its location. '7  A broad
reading of the opinion, therefore, would prevent a municipality from
completely excluding protected forms of entertainment, including live
nude dancing.
165. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. From the facts in the record it is clear
that entertainment, including live entertainment, was permitted in the commercial zone. 452
U.S. at 64 n.3. The zoning ordinance, however, operated to ban only live nude dancing. Id
at 64.
166. Overbreadth challenges are sustained even if the particular claimant's speech is un-
protected because of "the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and per-
ceived grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes." Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 59 n.17.
167. See infra note 176.
168. For support for the proposition that Young created varying levels of first amendment
protection see Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected
Speech, 4 HASTINGS C NST. L. Q. 321, 357-59 (1977).
169. Justices Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger all thought it neces-
sary to write separate opinions. 452 U.S. at 77, 79, 85.
170. I.d at 68 n.7.
171. The Court in Young presaged such a result when it acknowledged that "[t]he situa-
tion would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly re-
stricting access to, lawful speech." 427 U.S. at 71 n.35.
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Five of the Justices recognized the potential for this broad reading
and expressed concern about the scope of the holding. Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Stewart, wrote separately for the sole purpose of ex-
pressing their view that the holding should not extend to a residential
community that wished to ban or severely limit all commercial uses.
172
According to these Justices, a carefully drawn ordinance that regulated
or banned all commercial public entertainment "could be appropriate
and valid in a residential community where all commercial activity is
excluded. Similarly, a residential community should be able to limit
commercial establishments to essential 'neighborhood' services permit-
ted in a narrowly zoned area."' 173 This opinion failed to include rea-
soning or precedent in support of this view. The fact that Justices
Powell and Stewart so chose to hypothesize, however, evidences that
* the majority opinion is susceptible to an expansive interpretation.
Justices Stevens and Burger (joined by Justice Rehnquist) ex-
pressed similar concern in separate opinions.174 The rationale for ex-
cluding certain forms of expression from residential communities is
questionable. Their argument seems to be that local power to deal with
local problems is broad, and. the Court traditionally has deferred and
should continue to defer, to the zoning authority's judgment. 75 Such
deference should persist when nonpolitical or nonphilosophical expres-
sion, including adult entertainment, is involved because such expres-
sion does not warrant complete constitutional protection. 176 According
to this view, as long as there is reasonable access to the form of en-




172. 452 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
173. Id
174. Id at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In a footnote, Justice Stevens stated that he had "no doubt that some residential communi-
ties may, pursuant to a carefully drawn ordinance, regulate or ban commercial public en-
tertainment within their boundaries. Surely, a municipality zoned entirely for residential
use need not create a special commercial zone solely to accommodate purveyors of en-
tertainment." Id at 84 n. 1 (citations omitted).
175. Id at 79-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 85 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
176. Justice Stevens stated that "even though the foliage of the First Amendment may
cast protective shadows over some forms of nude dancing, its roots were germinated by more
serious concerns that are not necessarily implicated by a content-neutral zoning ordinance
banning commercial exploitation of live entertainment." 452 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (citing 427 U.S. at 60-61) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Chief Justice Burger main-
tained that "[t]o invoke the First Amendment to protect the activity [live nude dancing]
involved in this case trivializes and demeans that great amendment." Id at 88 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
177. Id at 80 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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This argument has some practical appeal; few would advocate
constitutionally mandating the introduction of live nude dancing in a
residential community. It ignores, however, important precedent as
well as alternative means available to prevent such a scenario. 178 Ini-
tially, this argument grants local government great power in a situation
that usually has called for a high standard of judicial review. Prece-
dent indicates that strict scrutiny should apply when a fundamental
right is even incidentally involved. 179 These three Justices attempt to
circumvent the need for strict scrutiny by finding the right involved to
be of a lesser magnitude, thus triggering a less rigorous standard of
review.'8 0 Their authority for this proposition appears to be Young. 181
Because a clear majority of the Justices in Young did not support this
view, however, its precedential value is open to question.
Also questionable is the view of Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and
Chief Justice Burger that a total exclusion of protected expression is
permissible if there is reasonable access to the form of expression
outside the community. The application of the reasonable access doc-
trine in this context significantly expands the notion of reasonable ac-
cess as developed and applied in other contexts." 2 These Justices
would analyze the legitimacy of a local zoning ordinance based upon
conditions outside the zoning authority's sphere of control. This view
leaves unanswered several troubling questions. How can a residential
178. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of available
alternatives.
179. "Even where a challenged regulation restricts freedom of expression only incidentally
or only in a small number of cases, we have scrutinized the governmental interest furthered
by the regulation and have stated that the regulation must be narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary intrusion on freedom of expression." 452 U.S. at 69 n.7 (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)) (emphasis added); see also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
180. See supra note 176; see also supra note 168.
181. Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis in Young, which suggests that adult en-
tertainment should receive less protection than other forms of expression, was joined by only
three other Justices. 427 U.S. at 73 n.l (Powell, J., concurring).
182. Prior cases discussing the reasonable access doctrine refer to providing access to the
form of expression within the forum or entity attempting to regulate the expression. Thus,
the entity regulating the expression was also responsible for assuring some reasonable access
to it. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 777 (1976)
(complete suppression of the advertising of drug prices within the state held unreasonable
because it did not provide reasonable access to the communication within the state); f.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 118 (1972) (restriction on picketing school
during school hours held reasonable because appellant was able to picket school during
nonschool hours); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-89 (1948) (ban on use of a sound truck
within city to communicate ideas held reasonable as long as the ideas could be communicat-
ed within the city by less obtrusive means).
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community ensure that reasonable access to commercial entertainment
outside its jurisdiction will remain? What happens if the outside com-
mercial entertainment establishments go out of business or the commu-
nity within which they are located decides to exclude them? Will the
residential community's enactment be invalidated by such unilateral
outside action?
Although this view is not asserted in the majority opinion, it nev-
ertheless adumbrates a serious erosion of first amendment protection of
expression. Collectively, these five Justices would allow local govern-
ments to expand their zoning power, in effect, to censor completely cer-
tain forms of heretofore protected expression.
C 4 Commercial-Residential Dichotomy?
One implication that may be drawn from the opinions advocating
an expansion of the reasonable access doctrine is that a zoning entity's
power to exclude protected expression depends upon the existence and
nature of commercial uses within that entity. In response to the Bor-
ough's contention that the ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction, the majority identified the crucial question as
"'whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.' "83 The
Court then determined that because the Borough had allowed commer-
cial uses 184 that posed problems similar to commercial live entertain-
ment, it had failed to demonstrate that live entertainment was
"basically incompatible" with those uses. 18  This reasoning left open
the possibility, raised by the Borough, that had the Borough excluded
all commercial uses, live entertainment (a commercial use) would be
patently incompatible with the "normal" activity in a completely resi-
dential community, and on that score, excludable:8 6 hence, a commer-
cial-residential dichotomy.
While the majority opinion left open the possibility of a total ex-
clusion of protected expression, based on whether the zoning entity al-
lowed any commercial use, five Justices expressly posited that an
exclusion on the basis of such a commercial-residential distinction
183. 452 U.S. at 75 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. at 116-17).
184. See supra note 71.
185. 452 U.S. at 75.
186. Id The Court stated in a footnote: "Thus, our decision today does not establish that
every unit of local government entrusted with zoning responsibilities must provide a com-
mercial zone in which live entertainment is permitted." Id at n.18.
Vol. 15
SCHAD v. BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM
would be permissible.187 All five asserted that a hypothetical residen-
tial community could invoke the zoning power to exclude commercial
entertainment if it had excluded or severely limited commercial uses
generally. 8 The inevitable conclusion is that at least five members of
the Schad Court would allow the zoning power to create less freedom
of expression in residential communities than in large urban centers or
communities with established commercial zones.
Because, prior to Schad, entertainment was considered a fully pro-
tected form of expression under the first amendment, 8 9 the justification
for allowing its total exclusion from residential communities must be
sought in the expanded view of reasonable access in nearby communi-
ties. As pointed out by Justice Blackmun, "[ilt would be a substantial
step beyond [Young] to conclude that a town or a county may legisla-
tively prevent its citizens from engaging in or having access to forms of
protected expression that are incompatible with its majority's concep-
tion of the 'decent life' solely because these activities are sufficiently
available in other locales." 190 Both Justices Blackmun and White ex-
pressly asserted the traditional view that" '[o]ne is not to have the exer-
cise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' "191 Evidently, the
Justices in Schad disagree regarding the validity of the rationale under-
lying the commercial-residential dichotomy.1 92
Prior to Schad, the legitimacy of a time, place, or manner restric-
tion depended upon the existence of reasonable access to alternative
channels of communication within the forum imposing the regulation
of expression. 93 The Justices advocating a commercial-residential di-
chotomy would redefine the "forum" to include more than one autono-
mous political subdivision. The aggregate effect of myriad local
communities excluding certain forms of admittedly protected expres-
187. Id at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 84 n.1 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment);
id at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id
189. See supra note 95.
190. Id at 78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
191. Id Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
192. It appears that Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun do not support the
notion that protected expression may be excluded from one zoning entity so long as it is
available within another zoning entity reasonably nearby. See supra text accompanying
notes 190-91.
193. See supra note 182. In previous cases, the reasonableness of the regulation was judg-
ed by the availability of alternative channels of communication within the governmental
entity seeking to regulate the expression.
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sion would result in a vast disparity of protection throughout the coun-
try as well as within certain regions. Individuals from residential
communities would be forced to depend on other communities, in
which they have no representation or control, for the full exercise of
their constitutional rights. Conversely, residents of communities with
established commercial zones would have to bear any costs incident to
providing access to the expression, while members of the exclusively
residential communities would receive a gratuitous benefit.
Moreover, granting a community the power to exclude otherwise
protected expression in order to "provide a setting of tranquility"
194
evokes the spectre of a local majority, acting with governmental ap-
proval, imposing its views as to the value of particular forms of expres-
sion upon an unconsenting minority. The first amendment has
traditionally been construed to prevent just such a result. 19
. Alternatives to Zoning as a Regulatory Device
Enlarging the zoning power to exclude protected expression un-
avoidably raises the issue of governmental censorship. The Court tra-
ditionally has had a strong aversion to such censorship. "Our distaste
for censorship - reflecting the national distaste of a free people - is
deep-written in our law."' 96 Before furnishing local communities with
a new instrument for imposing censorship, existing alternatives for con-
trolling objectionable forms of expression should have been carefully
considered.
In both Young and Schad, adult entertainment was the basis for
the community's concern and action. The Court's obscenity decisions
have vested broad power in local government to exclude expression
found to be obscene. 97 If a community finds a form of adult expres-
194. 452 U.S. at 85 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
195. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1949).
If the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression that more
than a 'few of us' would take up arms to defend, then the right of free expression
would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion. The guarantees
of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such majoritarian
limitations on individual liberty.
427 U.S. at 86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975).
197. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller established a three part test for
obscenity:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards,'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by.. . state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
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sion to be without redeeming value, it should be allowed to exclude it
only by the standards established in the Court's obscenity decisions.
The zoning power should not be made available as a vehicle for cir-
cumventing the first amendment principles underlying the obscenity
law.
Similarly, communities are empowered to regulate and exclude
forms of entertainment, including live nude dancing, in connection
with the use of alcohol under the twenty-first amendment.1 98 If a com-
munity's interest could be served by the proper exercise of this estab-
lished power, it would obviate the need to extend the zoning power.
Additionally, under the principles set down in Young, communi-
ties have the power to regulate closely the location of adult entertain-
ment. Many larger communities may well be able to deal with their
problem under established principles without the expedient of exclu-
sion presented in Schad
The Court also has recognized the power of local communities to
control nonobscene adult expression in order to protect children. 199
Conceivably, a residential community with a legitimate concern for the
children residing or attending school within its boundaries could ex-
clude adult expression for that limited, but compelling, purpose. Once
again, there would be no need to expand the already broad zoning
power into this area.
Finally, private land use devices are available to preserve the resi-
dential character of a neighborhood."c Aside from the argument that
private controls are a more economically efficient means of land use
allocation, these devices would avoid direct governmental or legislative
involvement in the determination of the value of a protected form of
expression.
The above discussion briefly outlines existing means for control-
ling objectionable or undesirable forms of expressive activities, includ-
ing adult entertainment. It is submitted that the Justices who
Id at 24; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
198. In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court held that the states have
broad power under the twenty-first amendment to regulate alcohol, and therefore were justi-
fied in imposing strict regulation of nudity and sexual explicitness in establishments serving
liquor.
199. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
200. See generally Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 711-19 (1973). The residential character of a
neighborhood can be maintained privately through collective property rights established un-
der condominium ownership. Similarly, if a single developer initially owns an entire neigh-
borhood,.he can effectively exclude many uses through the use of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions. See R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 16 (1977).
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advocated the extension of the zoning power to include the suppression
of protected forms of expression did so prematurely. Absent specific
facts and circumstances, it is difficult to speculate whether a hypotheti-
cal residential community will be unable to deal with a troublesome
form of protected expression under established alternatives. After
Schad, it is reasonable to expect that some local communities, relying
on the dicta concerning their ability to exclude protected expression,2 °'
may enact zoning ordinances which exclude protected expression
before carefully considering established alternatives. First amendment
rights of free expression may suffer unnecessary curtailment as a result.
Instead of endorsing such an expansive view of the zoning power,
in the absence of specific facts demonstrating an urgent need, the five
Justices who advocated the propriety of a total exclusion of expression
by a commercial-residential dichotomy might better have protected
constitutional rights by following the suggestion in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence:
This case does not require articulation of a rule for evaluating
the meaning of "reasonable access" in different contexts. The
scope of relevant zoning authority varies widely across our
country, as do geographic configurations and types of com-
merce among neighboring communities, and this issue will
doubtless be resolved on a case-by-case basis.20 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The Schad decision is the first instance where a majority of the
Supreme Court has sustained a first amendment challenge to the zon-
ing power. It clearly delineates a specific area where the traditional
special presumption of validity enjoyed by zoning ordinances will not
.prevail, and it promises active judicial review of zoning enactments
that even incidentally encroach upon first amendment freedoms. Local
zoning authorities are put on notice to draft with precision an ordi-
nance that may implicate protected rights of expression.
The Schad Court, however, declined an opportunity to clarify pre-
cisely the degree of protection extended to nonobscene forms of adult
entertainment as against local zoning enactments. By eschewing the is-
sue, the decision failed to dispel the plurality rationale in Young which
expressly limited the constitutional protection accorded adult entertain-
ment. Schad may thus have strengthened the suggestion, which
201. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
202. 452 U.S. at 78-79.
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originated in Young, that adult entertainment represents a unique and
perplexing problem which may best be dealt with by the zoning
power.2
0 3
Moreover, Schad may demonstrate, by implication, how local
communities may completely exclude otherwise protected forms of ex-
pression through artful manipulation of the zoning power. The danger
inherent in vesting such power in local authorities was recognized by
Justice Powell in Young, when he cautioned that "courts must be alert
to the possibility of direct rather than incidental effect of zoning on
expression, and especially to the possibility of using the power to zone
as a pretext for suppressing expression ...." Despite all its lan-
guage concerning the protection of expression, Schad may have en-
hanced the potential for abuse of the zoning power.
Terrence M. King
203. See F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BusNESsEs 45 (1977).
204. 427 U.S. at 84 (PowelL J., concurring).
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